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 
Abstract— Social networking sites (SNSs), with their large 
numbers of users and large information base, seem to be perfect 
breeding grounds for exploiting the vulnerabilities of people, 
the weakest link in security. Deceiving, persuading, or 
influencing people to provide information or to perform an 
action that will benefit the attacker is known as “social 
engineering.” While technology-based security has been 
addressed by research and may be well understood, social 
engineering is more challenging to understand and manage, 
especially in new environments such as SNSs, owing to some 
factors of SNSs that reduce the ability of users to detect the 
attack and increase the ability of attackers to launch it. This 
work will contribute to the knowledge of social engineering by 
presenting the first two conceptual models of social engineering 
attacks in SNSs. Phase-based and source-based models are 
presented, along with an intensive and comprehensive overview 
of different aspects of social engineering threats in SNSs. 
 
Index Terms— Social engineering, Social networking sites, 
Information security, Deception, Privacy.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Threats in information security generally come through 
the vulnerabilities of technologies or the vulnerabilities of 
people. However, while technology-based threats are well 
discussed, and addressed in many studies, human-based 
threats seem to be less attractive to researchers in the 
information technology field, perhaps because of the 
complexity of understanding and predicting the human 
behaviors that lead to human vulnerabilities. Social 
engineering is the type of security attack that exploits those 
vulnerabilities to meet the desires of the attacker [1]. It has 
been found that social engineering attacks pose the most 
significant security risks; they are more challenging to 
control [2, 3]. Currently, cyber attacks have more to do with 
manipulating humans than ever [4]. 
Since the first recognizable appearance of social 
networking sites (SNSs) in 1997, with the social network site 
SixDegrees.com [5], people have been attracted to those sites 
to construct their profiles and communicate with each other 
in different ways depending on the nature of the site. SNSs 
also have been implementing a wide variety of technical 
features that enable people, companies, organizations, or 
governmental institutions to do a variety of services [5]. As 
the numbers of users of SNSs have been increasing 
dramatically, the amount of sensitive and private information 
of people, companies, organizations, or governmental 
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institutions and their activities is also increasing 
dramatically. This not only makes SNSs attractive to faithful 
users but also makes them perfect breeding grounds for 
malicious users and attackers. Information is always under 
threat, and it can be intercepted, modified, or exposed. The 
facilities that are setup to monitor such attacks are also 
constantly under attack [6]. Such attacks shape the 
challenges of providing usability and sociability, which are 
the main purposes of SNSs, as well as ensuring integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability, which are standard 
principles of security. 
The aim of this paper is to present phase-base and 
source-base models of social engineering threats in SNSs. 
This aim can be achieved through answering three main 
questions concerning social engineering threats in SNSs: 
1. How does the social engineer plan and perform the 
attack? 
2. How do SNSs help social engineers to plan and 
launch the attack? 
3. How do victims fall for attacks on SNSs? 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, 
we explain the motivation to study social engineering in 
SNSs. Section III describes the method and related works. In 
section IV, we present two conceptual models of social 
engineering in SNSs, one is phase-based, and the other is 
source-based. We conclude in section V. 
  
II. MOTIVATION TO STUDY SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN SNSS 
The Institute of Management and Administration (IOMA) 
reported social engineering as the top security threat for 2005. 
They indicate that social engineering threats, which are 
human-based, are on the rise owing to continued 
improvements in protections against technology-based 
threats [7]. According to a survey done by Dimension 
Research (2011) on 850 IT and security professionals 
located in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Australia, and New Zealand, 48% of participants 
had been victims of social engineering and had experienced 
25 or more attacks in 2010 and 2011. Social engineering 
attacks cost victims an average of $25,000 to $100,000 per 
security incident, the report states. Of the participants, 39% 
believe that the SNSs are the most common source of social 
engineering threats, and only 26% of the participants in that 
survey actively train employees on social engineering threats. 
Although many organizations recognize the importance of 
controlling security threats, many fail to recognize the 
dangers of social engineering attacks [8]. 
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A study that included more than 4,000 users of Facebook 
found that most participants are willing to provide large 
amounts of personal information in SNSs, thus exposing 
themselves to various physical and cyber risks [9]. Now, the 
use of SNSs as the main tool of social interaction results in a 
loss of privacy [10]. This therefore opens users and their 
originations or networks to becoming targets of major 
security threats [11]. 
Through providing an introduction to security issues in the 
area of SNSs, and highlighting some threats in SNSs, the 
European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) indicates that SNSs can be dangerous weapons in 
the hands of spammers, unscrupulous marketers, and social 
engineers who may take criminal advantage of users [12]. 
Nagy and Pecho (2009) have analyzed and validated the 
possibilities of misusing SNSs due to irresponsible behavior 
of users [13]. In addition, the baseline success rate for using 
information obtained from SNSs in phishing attacks has been 
established [14]. Because of the lack of users’ awareness, 
social engineering is considered a low-cost and effective 
form of attack [15]. Moreover, some researchers have started 
investigating in automating social engineering, hijacking, 
and phishing in social networking sites [16, 17]. 
The risk of social engineering in SNSs is expected to 
increase in the future because of the fact that the information 
that users provide about themselves are the most valuable 
elements to the social networking site providers. Therefore, 
SNSs’ providers will keep encouraging users to reveal and 
share more personal information. Researchers have given 
examples of some of the tactics that are used by the providers 
of SNSs to persuade users to share their personal information 
[18, 19]. Providers of SNSs use such information in 
marketing and advertisements in which they select specific 
groups of users, based on their specifications, to receive 
specific product advertisements; therefore, we expect there 
to be an increase in social engineering exploits in the future, 
unless effective countermeasures are deployed. SNSs are 
also expected to continue being the perfect place for social 
engineers to launch their attacks owing to other 
characteristics, such as easy and free joining and the variety 
of content that social engineers can make and use, such as 
news, stories, hyperlinks, photos, videos, and applications, 
which can be employed in many different attacks [20].   
 
III. METHOD AND RELATED WORKS 
A holistic model for social engineering attacks has been 
proposed by Nohlberg and Kowalski (2008) [21].  However, 
their proposed model was based in the real life situation. 
Although social engineering in SNSs shares some 
characteristics of real life social engineering; however, social 
networking sites have other specific and unique 
characteristics. West, Mayhorn, Hardee, and Mendel (2009) 
have divided the factors that lead users to make poor security 
decisions into three categories: 1) user factors, such as 
problem solving limitation and decision making heuristic and 
experience; 2) technology factors, such as the credible 
appearance and personal relevance of an e-mail or a website 
that tricks the users; and 3) environmental factors, such as 
time pressure and inattention blindness, where users may not 
perceive details of the threat [22]. By looking at SNSs, we 
can see that they have specific and unique user, 
technological, and environmental factors that require a 
specific conceptualization. 
In this paper, we present phase-based and source-based 
models of social engineering in SNSs using literature study.  
The literature we have studied included some actual 
experimental research who have investigated the viability of 
using SNSs in social engineering attacks, e.g. [9, 14, 23, 
24], interviewing information security specialists with years 
of extensive experience in social engineering, e.g. [25], and 
many other studies that review the state of the art in social 
engineering and SNSs’ security. This has given us a 
comprehensive understanding of the concept, and allowed 
us to model it based on different perspectives. 
 
IV. MODELS DESCRIBING SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN SNSS 
A. Phase-Base Model 
 
In order to model social engineering in SNSs, first we need 
to explain and conceptualize how the social engineer 
influences, persuades, and deceives victims to get them to 
offer up wanted information, or to perform actions that the 
social engineer wants them to do. Figure 1 explains the eight 
phases that social engineers in SNSs need to go through in 
order to trick the victims. The success of a social engineering 
attack is based on how well the attacker performs the 
following eight phases: 
 
Phase 1: Using suitable gates of SNSs to gather 
information. Phase 1 involves information gathering about 
the victims in order to understand their vulnerabilities. This 
is an important phase in order to choose a perfect tactic and 
develop a good plan [26]. The information that will be 
gathered can be any available personal or organizational 
information, such as name, age, work, position, interests, 
hobbies, address, banks the victims deals with, friends the 
victim trusts, or even the car a victim dreams to have. Some 
of the information available might not be useful by its own; 
however, it can be used by a social engineer to gain more 
information that is valuable [27]. In section 3.2, we will 
explain the different gates of SNSs that social engineers can 
use to reach and gather such information. 
 
 
Phase 2: Determining the tactic and developing a plan. 
Depending on the information gathered in the previous 
phase, and the goal the social engineers want to achieve, the 
social engineer will determine which tactic would be more 
suitable and successful to trick the victim. This phase also 
involves developing a good plan to reach the goal. The plan 
can include “pretexting,” in which a social engineer creates a 
setting designed to persuade the victim to fall for the trick 
[28]. There are many commonly used techniques in social 
engineering. Those techniques include but are not limited to 
the following: 
 
  
1. “Phishing,” which is enticing a victim to download an 
attachment or to click on an embedded hyperlink 
[29]. This technique can be used to gather privacy 
information; manipulate users to type or provide 
critical information, such as their usernames and 
passwords [30]; or installing malicious backdoor 
programs that allow the attacker full access to the 
system [31]. Phishing attacks accounted for more 
than a quarter of all reported computer crimes in 
2007 [32]. SNSs can be used to gather information 
such as e-mail addresses, or any information that 
helps to trick the user to fall victim to phishing. 
Moreover, SNSs can be used easily and effectively 
to attract victims to respond to phishing. 
2. “Persuasion and bribery,” which is attempting to 
persuade an employee to do an action even if this 
action bypasses company rules. There are multiple 
means of persuasion, and one of them is giving a 
bribe to an employee [32].  
3. “Shoulder surfing,” This technique involves looking 
over an unsuspecting user’s shoulder while the user 
is entering his/her user name and password or while 
he/she is doing his/her work. This is a kind of 
spying to gain valuable information [32]. This can 
be done in SNSs easily by spying over the activities, 
posts, tags, or comments that are made by the users.  
4. “Spam,” which involves sending messages to various 
people to ask for certain personal information, to 
get them to buy or sell products and services, or to 
ask them to participate or donate for charitable 
works [30]. 
5. “Dumpster diving,” which is looking for valuable 
information in a company dumpster to find a phone 
directory, for example [32]. This can be done in 
SNSs, through diving into users’ profiles, groups, 
events, and pages to look for any valuable 
information that can help directly or indirectly.  
6. “Reverse attack,” in which the attacker does not 
establish contact with the victim. Rather, the social 
engineer tricks victims into contacting him/her. In 
this case, the victim will be extremely trusting of the 
attacker, and the attacker will take the chance to ask 
the victim to give up any information or to do any 
action [33].  
 
Phase 3: Relying on one or more socio-psychological 
factors. People, in general, think that they are good at 
detecting deception and lies. However, research indicates 
that people have weakness and therefore perform poorly in 
detecting social engineering attacks [34, 35]. On the 
organizational level, the findings of a study done by [36] 
suggest that social engineers could succeed even among 
those organizations that identify themselves as being aware 
of social engineering techniques. Marett, Biros, and Knode 
(2004) have explained that the reason why people are weak 
and perform poorly in detecting deception is because of the 
“lie detector bias,” which is the assumption that most people 
are telling the truth [37]. Most of the books and studies that 
have been published regarding social engineering indicate 
that the main causes of human weaknesses that lead people to 
fall victim to social engineers are human socio-psychological 
characteristics [3, 30, 38, 39]. Human socio-psychological 
factors that influence users to certain behavior (e.g., liking, 
reciprocity, scarcity, social proof, fear, and strong affect) 
have been studied in marketing, in order to persuade 
customers to buy certain products [40]. 
 
Phase 4: Using suitable gates of SNSs to reach the 
victim. SNSs are not only useful for information gathering; 
they are also offer cheap and effective means of reaching 
victims and applying effective tricks [41]. Suitable gates will 
be discussed in more detail in the following section, the 
source-base model. 
 
Phase 5: Wearing a suitable hat and playing a suitable 
character. The social engineer in this phase, based on the 
information gathered, the developed tactics and plan, and the 
socio-psychological factors, will choose a specific character 
to play. This character can be a very poor person, a sexy girl, 
a wonderful friend, or any other suitable character. Social 
engineers can also impersonate a real, well-known person to 
the victim, such as a real friend, boss, relative, or even a real 
famous person [42]. This task is much easier in social 
networking sites where users can make multiple fake profiles 
and choose their names, photos, location, and other details 
easily. At the same time, it is more difficult for the victim to 
uncover the deception through a social networking site than 
in a face-to-face, real-life situation. The social engineer, who 
may wear any hat that helps him/her to attract any victim, 
depending on the victim’s vulnerabilities, can use the 
distance, anonymity, and absence of authentication 
mechanisms to abuse a victim [43]. The suitable hat shapes 
the character that the social engineer plays to make the victim 
feel trusting and safe and, therefore, to encourage the victim 
to accept the trick. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Phase-Based Model of Social Engineering in SNSs. 
 
Phase 6: Developing trust and a sense of safety. The 
success of social engineering is strongly tied to two main 
concepts: trust and safety. Those two concepts are related to 
human psychology and the experience of the victim. If the 
  
victim feels that he/she trusts the social engineer, or feels a 
sense of safety toward the trick made by the social engineer, 
then the probability of the success of the trick will be high. 
This requires that the social engineer go through additional 
tricks or wait for a certain amount of time before launching 
the attack. Trust and a sense of safety can affect social 
engineering in the following ways: 
 
1. Trust: It plays a vital role in social engineering; 
however, trust is a complicated word with multiple 
dimensions that lead to multiple meanings. It is used as a 
word or concept with no real definition [44]. Nevertheless, 
some researchers (e.g.,[45, 46] indicate that some people 
have a greater tendency to trust generally than do others. 
The trusting nature among human beings is not similar, 
and people believe what others say, depending on the trust 
they build. According to Mitnick and Simon (2001), a 
person who is under-trusting stands to lose a given benefit 
or opportunity, is paranoid, and always tense. Whereas, 
those who are overly trusting will monitor their actions 
less often and will be less efficient and possibly 
incompetent; therefore, social engineers will target them, 
which could result in the loss of money or useful 
information. Being overly trusting limits the cognitive 
functions of people in relation to their surroundings, such 
that they become so comfortable that their thoughts, 
actions, and attention is limited, thus making them 
subjects of manipulation [47].  
2. Safety. According to Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and 
Solomon, (1997), when people are threatened, they will 
alter their behavior depending on the number of risks they 
can accommodate. This modification is a psychological 
reaction that is determined by the seriousness of an attack 
and the amount of loss that they think will be incurred 
because of the occurrence of a hazard [48]. For attackers, 
the ability to determine the maximum amount of threat that 
a person is willing to accommodate determines when to 
launch an attack [1]. Pyszczynski, Greenberg, and 
Solomon, (1997), has introduced a relationship between 
behavior and threat through the health belief model 
(HBM) [48]. This theory indicates that the probability of 
performing a risky action is determined by the perceived 
threat of taking that action and the perceived benefit of 
taking that action. The HBM indicates also that the 
perceived threat of taking an action is determined by the 
susceptibility to the threat and the seriousness of the threat 
[48]. Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) went further, stating 
that the problems of performing a risky action have been 
associated with the HBM and the situational theory of 
publics [49]. The latter suggests that a population can be 
classed depending on how they behave, that is whether 
they are active or passive [50]. The psychological issues 
concerned with this theory include 1) the extent of activity 
in the behavior, 2) familiarization with problems, and 3) 
the knowledge of constraints [51]. 
Phase 7: Choosing the perfect time. This phase 
involves seizing the best moment to launch the attack. 
Time pressure, for example, can affect the decisions that 
people make [52]. Time pressure affects the logical 
functioning of human judgment, and, therefore, under it, 
the victim is more willing to accept arguments that should 
be challenged [53]. In SNSs, a social engineer can watch 
the victims’ activities, posts, comments, and mode statuses 
to find the perfect moment to launch the attack or apply the 
planned trick. 
 
Phase 8: Using professional skills. The last task of the 
social engineer will determine the success of all of the 
previous phases. It involves performing a good scenario 
and dialogue with the victim, and avoiding any mistake 
that can help the victim to discover the deception [1]. The 
scenario and dialogue in SNSs can involve interaction 
with the victim through chatting, for example, or it can be 
through the content of the pages, profiles, and the walls, 
such as posts, tags, and comments. The professional skills 
include, for example, tact, persuasion, flattering, lobbying, 
or any social skills, depending on the situation of the 
victim and the type of trick.  
 
B. Source-Base Model 
 
In the previous model (Figure 1), we have described the 
different phases of the social engineering attack. In phase 
1 and phase 4, we have mentioned that there are different 
gates or sources of threats that the social engineer can 
enter through or use to gather information in order to 
understand the victim, to reach the victim, or to launch the 
attack trick. In this section we will explain those gates in 
more detail and discuss how different social engineering 
tactics or attacks work. The source-based model of social 
engineering in SNSs is shown in Figure 2. The three 
sources or gates of threats in SNSs are the following: 
 
 1. Insecure Privacy Setting 
 
Most SNSs classify users in relation to others, as a 
“friend,” “friend of friend,” or “unfriend” (public users). 
Some of them also allow users to divide their friends into 
different groups; each group has different privacy setting. 
However, by recognizing SNSs, we can see that a large 
percentage of users’ profiles are set to be shown publicly 
to any users in the social networking site, or even to any 
user from outside that site who uses any web search 
engine, such as Google or Yahoo!. Research indicates that 
the profile details of more than 100 million Facebook 
users were publicly accessible through search engines [9]. 
Other profiles are set to be shown to friend-of-friend users, 
or to all friends. The risk associated with making those 
profiles accessible or shown to others is high, and it is 
more dangerous for those who make their profiles shown 
publicly, than those who are open to friend-of-friend users 
or to all friends. 
 
 Users who own public profiles either set their profiles 
to be accessible publicly intentionally for different 
reasons, or because they did not change the default privacy 
setting of their profiles [9]. The steps that the social 
engineers go through in order to gain any information from 
  
any user of SNSs is illustrated in Figure 3. The more “Yes” 
the social engineer faces through the activity diagram, the 
more easily and quickly he/she reach the goal; the more 
“No” he/she faces, the more difficult it is to reach the goal. 
The users of SNSs are highly willing to reveal private or 
personal information on their profiles [9]. This 
information includes their names, birthdays, work, 
locations, telephone numbers, addresses, e-mail 
addresses, real photos, and many others critical 
information. Users, with the information they reveal 
online, expose themselves to social engineers who can use 
this information to launch various physical and cyber 
attacks. Their home addresses and e-mail addresses, for 
example, can be used in phishing [14]. Photos, names, 
birthdays, and addresses can be valuable information for 
pretexting, identity theft, impersonation, and other kinds 
of threats [23]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Source-Based Model of Social Engineering in SNSs. 
 
 
Profile publicity, availability, or accessibility to or by 
strangers, even if they are a friend of friend, is not a threat 
for the user alone, and it can lead to three types of threats. 
The first is individual vulnerability, where an individual is 
open to identity theft, physical attack, phishing, and so on 
[23]. The second is friends’ vulnerability, for example, the 
attacker impersonates a user to gain the trust of one of 
his/her friends [33]. The third is organization 
vulnerability, where, for example, an attacker crosses an 
organization’s security defenses through impersonating 
one of its employees [29], or manipulates one of its 
employees to perform an action that leads to an attack on 
the organization, such as downloading malicious software 
that aims to attack the organization’s system. 
 
2. Friendship and Connection with Strangers 
 
People have some psychological motives, such as 
entertainment or meeting new people, that can encourage 
them to talk with strangers over the Internet [54, 55]. 
Social engineers can use the psychological trick of starting 
a “friendship” with the victims in order to build trust 
between the attacker and the victims, and then abuse this 
trust to launch an attack. This type of attack could be to 
gain critical information from the victim or to get the 
victim to perform an action that benefits the attacker and 
hurts the victim or his/her organization [25]. Finding new 
friends is one of the most common features of SNSs. This 
allows social engineers to find any user easily by using the 
search engine of that site or using any other web search 
engine, in some cases, and then sending a friendship 
request. 
Most SNSs allow any user to choose the name, photo, 
age, school, and other personal information freely. This 
makes it easy for the social engineer to impersonate any 
identity in order to gain trust from the victim. When the 
victim accepts the friendship invitation, the social 
engineer can establish a direct connection, engage in small 
talk, or act as if he/she has the same interests, problems, or 
experiences of the victim [10]. Moreover, being in a 
“friend list” of a victim, allows the social engineer to spy 
on posts or activities that the victim makes. Moreover, 
some social network sites automatically recommend new 
friends for the users depending on some common 
elements, such as friends, schools, or groups in common. 
This feature can lead to another important other technique 
of social engineering called reverse attack. In this attack, 
the social engineer connects to the victim’s friends first, so 
that the victim gets tricked into contacting the social 
engineer him/herself [33]. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Activity Diagram for Information Gaining in SNSs. 
 
Social engineers can also use specialized spamming 
software such as FriendBot, to automate sending 
friendship invitations [12]. Another example of such 
software is “Facebook blaster,” which can be used to 
collect a huge number of users’ IDs and send huge 
amounts of friend requests and messages to users [24]. 
This is a very dangerous tool because it can select specific 
groups of users based on specific criteria to launch a 
specific attack. That is, it possible for the attacker to target 
specific organization’s employees with specific attacks, 
such as phishing, viruses, or malware, and the success 
probability of such attacks is high. 
 
  
 
3. Insecure Dealing with Content 
 
Content is all available information in users’ profiles 
and different pages or groups, such as news stories, blog, 
tags, posts, notes, videos, photos, hyperlinks, and so on. 
Users of Facebook, for example, share more than 30 
billion pieces of content each month [20]. Insecure dealing 
with the content available on the SNSs leads people to fall 
victim to many social engineering threats. The content 
may have malicious software such as viruses and worms. 
This can be embedded in the posts or messages through a 
hyperlink that leads to an executable file, for example, or 
to a hyperlink of a page that includes another hyperlink to 
an executable file with some instructions that trick the 
victim to download that file [12]. 
Phishing is also a potential threat of dealing insecurely 
with content. Phishing can be posted in SNSs as a story, 
offer, or alert message that attract victims to download an 
attachment or click on an embedded hyperlink. The aim of 
phishing is to manipulate users to provide critical 
information, such as username and password [30], or to 
install malicious backdoor programs that allow the 
attacker full access to the system [31].  
Spam is another example of such threats, and it is a 
critical issue, since research suggests that SNSs may 
replace e-mail as a means of communication [12]. 
Moreover, for those SNSs that allow users to post HTML 
in their profiles, users are vulnerable to cross-site scripting 
attacks (XSS), which enable attackers to install client-side 
script into a profile that is viewed by other users [12]. In 
addition, there is “defamation” and “ballot stuffing,” 
which are forms of attack that aim to destroy the reputation 
of a person or system [56].  
Finally, the social engineer can use the content to trick 
the victim to reveal some information when they comment 
under that content or when they share it. Commenting and 
sharing provide an alternative means of interaction with 
victims when the victim rejects the friendship invitation 
that the social engineer has sent. Groups, pages, and 
events accounts that allow users to post, comment, tag, and 
read are perfect ground for social engineers who want to 
reach large numbers of victims. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
SNSs are among the most common means of social 
engineering attacks. In this paper, we have explained the 
risks associated with SNSs in terms of social engineering. 
We have presented two conceptual models; each is based on 
different aspects. Phase-based, and source-based models 
have been presented along with an intensive and 
comprehensive overview of social engineering attacks in 
social networks sites. We have explained that successful 
attackers of SNSs go through eight different phases, and 
come from three common sources. By using these two 
models, researchers can get a fuller picture of social 
engineering threats in SNSs, and take one of many possible 
directions of further research. 
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